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Societal priorities in energy and transport policy 
The integrated energy and climate policy 
The most important goals of the integrated European energy and climate policy include 
security of supply, competitiveness and sustainability. Advances in energy efficiency have 
a positive effect on all of these goals and may therefore be seen as a goal in itself. The 
European countries have shared these goals for a long time, which is also reflected in the 
national energy policies and other common EU policies, such as the Environmental Action 
Programme, the internal electricity and gas markets, research and technology 
development programmes, etc. 
The goals are specified by the Commission of the European Communities (2006) and in the 
decisions of the Council of the European Union (2007) at the landmark summit in March 
2007: “increasing security of supply; ensuring the competitiveness of European economies 
and the availability of affordable energy; promoting environmental sustainability and 
combating climate change.” (p. 11)1 
The European Union has initiated a large number of research, development, and 
demonstration projects focusing on specific technological and socioeconomic issues in the 
use of hydrogen and fuel cell technology in transport. These activities give rise to the more 
general question about the extent to which a transition to hydrogen from oil product 
transport fuels will contribute to achieving the goals of the European energy and climate 
policy. This is the question addressed in this paper. 
Transitions to hydrogen fuels in transport 
The mobility offered by automotive transport technologies is an important factor in 
enhancing the potentials for economic growth and at the same time an important aim of 
economic growth. Changing the energy basis of this mobility is maybe the most 
challenging component of the integrated energy and climate policy and it there. 
The three goals of the energy and climate policy are only achievable to the extend 
alternatives to the historic reliance on fossil fuels are developed. Whereas, alternatives to 
fossil fuels – and fossil alternatives to oil – have been established for decades in the power 
                                                 
1 The Commission of the European Communities (2007a) also mentions an additional goal, elimination of 
energy poverty (albeit in a slightly different meaning than known from the development world). This goal, 
however, will be excluded from the scope of this paper. 
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and heat sector, and in industrial energy use, the transport sector is still almost entirely 
fuelled by oil products as it has been during almost a century. Thus, most of the 
innovation regarding fuels, vehicles and related infrastructures is “locked in” to the 
specific fuel-powertrain configuration of oil products and combustion engines. Business-
as-Usual in the transport sector would seriously jeopardize all three goals (International 
Energy Agency (IEA) (2007)). 
The technology lock-in links the growth of mobility with a parallel growth of demand for 
oil based fuels. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) US DOE (2008) forecasts a 
50% increase in world demand of liquid transport fuels from 2005 to 2030. During the 
2000s it has been optimistically assumed by the EIA, IEA and others that the price 
increases resulting from this gap would give rise to investments in oil production 
development. These investments and the new oil supplies they would have brought on-
stream have not materialised. Synthetic fuels based on tar sands, oil shale, or coal, and 
extraction of oil from more difficult and costly deposits may fill some of it, but these 
options are also in varying degrees characterized by a high energy consumption and 
environmental pressure in the production process. 
On this background, there is an increasing recognition that we are at the beginning of a 
technology transition in transport energy from oil based fuels to alternative primary 
energy sources including other fossil fuels, biofuels, and non-combustible energy source 
based electricity.  
A future transition to hydrogen is a challenging process that involves government 
coordination at all levels and consistently though a long period of maybe 50 years. For 
such a sustained all-European government policy to be realistic, the transition will have to 
contribute significantly to the overall policy goals listed above. 
Using electricity as transport fuel makes use of the electro-motor technology, which in 
many respects is superior to the internal combustion engine. Combustion is necessarily 
associated with heat losses, emissions of air pollutants, and fairly complex engines, 
whereas electro-motors are free of these drawbacks. The problem is, that it electricity is 
difficult to use exactly for automotive engines because it is difficult to store. Hydrogen and 
fuel cell technology offers the possibility storing electricity as well as using hydrogen 
derived from combustible energy sources.2  
                                                 
2 A full introduction to hydrogen and fuel cell technology is offered in Sorensen (2005). 
5 
 
In this sense, hydrogen is like a convertible currency. It is possible to convert all kinds of 
energy to hydrogen and, then, convert it into any energy use. Thus, hydrogen can serve as 
a bridge between any other primary energy source than oil into use as a transport fuel. It 
is, however, important to note that hydrogen is only an energy carrier, not an energy 
source, as many people still seem to believe. Consequently, the contribution of using 
hydrogen as transport fuels must depend fully on how and from which primary energy 
sources, the hydrogen is produced. This is the starting point of the attempts to quantify 
these contributions below. 
The beginning of the transition 
The fuel cell electric vehicle (FCEV) 
The fuel cell electric vehicle (FCEV) is an electric vehicle just as the battery electric vehicle 
(BEV), the hybrid electric vehicle (HEV) and the plug-in hybrid (PHEV). HEVs have been 
sold since 1997 and BEVs were marketed in a period in the 1990s and in the early 2000s, 
but with little success. Several large car producers have announced that they will 
reintroduce BEVs as well as PHEVs in 2009-10. 
The drawback of the BEV is the low energy density of batteries resulting in a high weight 
and short range (100-200 km per charging, lower in cold climate) combined with long 
recharging and uncertain durability of batteries. There is a heated debate about whether 
innovation can change these properties significantly, but even BEVs with these properties 
can meet the requirements of a significant share of car users. In particular if the plans for 
building a network of battery exchange stations are realised (see 
http://www.betterplace.com).  
The market segment that requires a longer range per refilling is already offered a range of 
advanced energy efficient ICVs and there is little doubt that they and their descendants 
will gain an increasing market share. Hydrogen also applies as fuel for a combustion 
engine (H2ICV) with few emissions. Car users who prefer electric driving, but with a 
range, performance, and refilling comparable to ICVs will be able to choose PHEV 
providing an extended range based on ICE technology. FCEVs will offer a fully zero 
emission solution, that is, a full electric mode with a range, performance, and refilling 
comparable to ICVs. FCEVs will definitely be more expensive than BEVs, when they are 
introduced in large numbers at the market, but they will address another market segment. 
There are still important innovative breakthroughs that must be achieved for the fuel cell 
technology to be a realistic option for mass production. The major challenge is the fuel cell 
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itself, which today is made with heavy use of platinum as catalyst and with insufficient 
durability. Cheaper and more accessible catalysts and longer durability are necessary 
achievements before the technology can be used or “rolled out” in mass scale. 
There is an agitated debate as to whether it will ever happen. On the one hand progress is 
undeniable taking place year by year, but when a technological breakthrough will take 
place and how it will look like is difficult to predict. There are very different views in the 
industry as to when and if such progress will be achieved, but widespread confidence in 
the innovative progress that will result of advancing the practical use of the technology. 
Front runners such as Chrysler and Honda will start production in modest series (Honda 
200 vehicles over three years) already in the nearest years, but other car manufacturers 
plan to engage in FCEV production in 2020 or later. 
The California state programme for advancing zero emission vehicles (ZEVs = BEVs and 
FCEVs) and partly zero emission vehicles (PZEVs = PHEVs, HEVs, H2ICVs a.o.) has been 
effective since 1990. It is probably the most ambitious program for advancing the use of 
these technologies. The zero emission programme demands from car makers at the 
California market that they supply at least 25,000 FCEVs or 7,500 BEVs and 58,333 H2ICVs 
(or similar) in 2012-14 to the Californian market (California Environmental Protection 
Agency Air Resources Board (CARB) (2008)).  
The European Hydrogen & Fuel Cell Technology Platform (HFP) (2007) has become a Joint 
Technology Initiative for Fuel Cells and Hydrogen, which is a public-private partnership 
for development and deployment of these technologies in Europe. The programme 
anticipate introduction of FCEVs on the European market in numbers of 400,000 to 
1,800,000 a year in the period 2015-2020. This will allow “mass roll out” in the 2020s. 
In Japan, the car industry similarly begins an early commercialisation phase in 2015 to 
prepare for assembly line mass production of FCEVs later (Fuel Cell Commercialization 
Conference of Japan (FCCJ) (2008)).  
Such deadlines have been overrun before, but it without being too specific, we can assume 
that mass production and market availability of FCEVs will take place at least some time 
in the period 2020-25. This will mean that the FCEV can be produced at competitive costs, 
performance, and durability at some point of time in that period. This is the general 
assumption behind this paper. 
It should also be noted that the hydrogen and fuel cell technologies are developed for 
other than automotive uses as well. Commercial opportunities for fuel cells are already 
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identified and being exploited in niche markets such as forklifts, in emergency power 
generators back-up, in portable equipment such as laptops, and in stationary use as 
combined heat and power units. Synergies between innovative progresses in these 
different fields must be expected to advance the technology development for FCEVs. 
With the time frame assumed above, most of the contributions from the hydrogen 
transition to achieving the three goals will occur after 2020 and thus it is an important 
assumption that the policy continues after the 2020 targets have been reached.  
The primary energy basis for hydrogen 
At the current hydrogen market, hydrogen is a chemical rather than a fuel. Refineries use 
increasing amounts of hydrogen for desulphurisation and upgrading of heavier oil 
fractions. Ammonia production is another large hydrogen consumer. It is also used for 
numerous chemical processes involving a.o. metal, methanol, and plastics. Far most of the 
hydrogen is supplied by steam reforming of fossil fuels, in particular natural gas. A small 
fraction is supplied by electrolysis. It is produced by both technologies as a by-product as 
well as an on-purpose product. 
An expanding market for hydrogen as a transport fuel will change the properties of the 
hydrogen demand from few large to many small consumers and from chemical industry 
intensive areas to car intensive areas. It will probably require a storage and transport 
network which differs from the current by a finer grid of pipelines and more delivery of 
compressed rather than of cryogenic3 hydrogen. Moreover, in the boundaries of 
expanding hydrogen delivery networks, on-site production of hydrogen can be expected 
to supply the transport hydrogen demand. That is, hydrogen production in small or 
medium scale natural gas based plants or electrolysers at fuel stations. 
Future technologies for hydrogen production include among others high temperature 
electrolysis, gasification of biomass and hydrocarbons and separation of hydrogen from 
the gas, and microbiological processes. There are also high expectations to combustible 
fuel gasification with carbon capturing and sequestration (CCS) as a large source of the 
future hydrogen supply. The possible energy efficiency, emission leaks, infrastructures, 
and costs of this technology is, however, still too uncertain to determine its future 
competitiveness. Research and demonstration projects planned in the EU will probably 
make this knowledge available before 2020. 
 
                                                 
3 Hydrogen made liquid by freezing to -275 ◦C. 
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The performance and properties of these technologies are in the nature of the case 
unknown and it is even unknown whether they will be practical options in 2020 or later. 
When they are, they will have to be competitive with the important properties. 
Consequently, the role of the transition in achieving the societal goals will be considered 
mainly in the light of the two main hydrogen production technologies that are mastered 
today and the primary energy sources that can be expanded in the 2015-25 perspective. 
These pathways are shown in the following table. 
Table 1. Types of primary energy feedstock transformable to hydrogen. 
 Renewable  Non-Renewable  
Non-combustible 
(LT/HT electrolysis) 
Hydro, wind, wave, tidal, geo-
thermal, PV, microbial 
Nuclear 
Combustible 
(gasification, steam 
reforming) 
Biomass Fossil: oil, gas, coal, tar 
sands,.. 
 
Table 1 shows that hydrogen can be produced directly from the combustible fuels by 
gasification, partial oxidation, or steam reforming or by electrolysis from non-combustible 
resources. The latter option is, of course, identical for batteries and the hydrogen and fuel 
cell solution is in many respects equal to a battery solution, albeit with higher energy 
density.  
The question of how a future transition to hydrogen and battery stored energy for 
transport purposes will contribute to the European energy and environmental policy goals 
will be addressed below for each of these hydrogen pathways. 
Currently, hydrogen is often produced in combination with other products. In oil refining 
hydrogen is a by-product as well as a main product used as an input to refining processes 
or for heating. Chlorine-alkali plants produce hydrogen as a by-product of electrolysis and 
ammonia production uses it as an input. The air industry produces hydrogen in 
combination with other gasses.  
In the future, hydrogen will probably also be produced in combination with power, heat, 
other gasses and chemicals. Numerous other synergies can be expected to be exploited 
and it is difficult to foresee the resulting cost of hydrogen production. Production of 
hydrogen without by-products will most likely take place at hydrogen fillings stations and 
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in other small and medium scale applications, but even in this field on-going innovation 
pursues synergies and by-products.  
Thus, the following analysis is confined to assumptions of the key parameters that with 
certainty will be determining hydrogen fuel cost: conversion efficiencies and non-energy 
costs such as capital and labour costs of production plants and infrastructure. These 
simplifying assumptions reflect the general properties of a much more complex future 
transformation of primary fuel to hydrogen. In this way, the results should also attain 
more general validity than if they rest on very specific assumptions of distinct 
technologies. Fewer assumptions may also make the analysis more transparent.  
Energy efficiency 
The most attractive feature of the fuel cell technology is probably its superior energy 
efficiency as a part of a hydrogen-fuel cell-electro-motor powertrain, that is, in the Tank-
to-Wheel (TtW) part of the fuel chain. On the other hand, the energy loss in the Well-to-
Tank (WtT) part of the fuel chain is considerable, but the total Well-to-Wheel (WtW) 
efficiency is potentially better than even HEV solutions. 
Earlier studies of feasible scenarios for the introduction of hydrogen and fuel cell 
technology in automotive transport often compared the high efficiency of the fuel cell 
vehicle (FCEV) with rather fuel inefficient ICE vehicles. The Alternative Fuels Contact 
Group (2004) assumed the fuel cell system to be 100% more efficient than an ICE system. 
The US National Academy of Science US National Academy of Science (2004) assumed a 
66% efficiency advantage4 of FCEVs over ICVs. Ogden et al. (2004) assumed an efficiency 
advantage of 79% and the International Energy Agency (2005) an efficiency advantage of 
82% relative to advanced ICVs. 
At the time when FCEVs are introduced to the market, however, they will most likely 
compete with vehicles that are far more energy efficient. The following table shows the 
efficiency advantages of FCEVs over future grid-independent HEVs expected by the 
European WtW database Edwards et al. (2007) and the GREET model in the US Argonne 
National Laboratory (2008).5 
                                                 
4 An efficiency advantage of 66% equals an efficiency factor of 1.66, i.e. that an FCEV runs 66% further than 
an ICE on the equal energy content in the tank. 
5 These databases are the leading sources of comparable data for present and future technology choices of 
automotive technology. 
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Table 2. Expected efficiency advantage of FCEVs above grid-independent HEVs with advanced ICE 
technology in 2010 
ICE technology6 WtW (2010+) GREET (2015-20) 
Port Injection Spark 
Ignition (PISI) 
48-72% 58-59% 
Direct Injection 
Compression Ignition 
(DICI) 
50-55% 45-47% 
Source : Author’s calculations based on Argonne National Laboratory (2008), Edwards, Griesemann et al. (2007). 
The table shows that the expected fuel efficiencies of the nearest competing technologies 
are not that far from the expected fuel efficiency of the FCEV. In all cases the efficiency can 
be improved by taking more advantage of the battery-electro-motor system by using a 
plug-in battery. The efficiency of FCEVs is outstanding, but compared to its future 
competitors, one should not assume an efficiency advantage of more than 50%7. 
This assumption is used in the present paper as well as in the recent comprehensive study 
of feasible hydrogen roadmaps in Europe The HyWays Project (2008). 
The flip side of the high energy efficiency of all grid-dependent electric vehicles (including 
BEVs and, HEVs and FCEVs) is the high energy loss in transformation of primary energy 
to power and hydrogen. Natural gas reforming and electrolysis are used today with 
conversion efficiencies of 60-65% (see Hansen (2007b), (2007e)). For transport fuel use, it 
will additionally be necessary to use energy for compression, filling, a.o. today amounting 
to maybe 7-14% of the hydrogen produced. 
It is difficult to predict system efficiency of hydrogen production from natural gas and 
electricity in 2015-2025. The European Hydrogen & Fuel Cell Technology Platform (HFP) 
(2007) aims for a conversion efficiency by low temperature electrolysis of above 70% in 
2015 and the US DOE (2007) for 71% in 2017, but in system efficiency energy use for 
compression and refilling also has to be taken into account. For the conversion efficiency 
in natural gas reforming, the US target is 75% in 2015 whereas there is no European target.   
                                                 
6 PISI and DICI are basically petrol and diesel engines, respectively, but they can be adapted to various 
alternative fuels. 
7 A car that drives 35 km/l has an efficiency advantage of 50% over a car that drives 23 km/l. Such levels of 
fuel efficiency could very well characterize the competition between FCEVs and other efficient vehicles in 
2020.  
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The innovative efforts for increasing efficiency includes adding waste heat to the process, 
using nano-manipulated catalysts, high pressure, and other improvements. Hansen 
(2007b), (2007e) finds it unrealistic for the system efficiency in 2020 to exceed 70% in daily 
use, whereas the worst case efficiency will be 62% for natural gas reforming for natural gas 
reforming as well as electrolysis. 
It can be calculated that with a 50% tank-to-wheel efficiency advantage and a system 
efficiency of conventional fuels of 92%, the system efficiency can be as low as 62% before 
the overall well-to-wheel efficiency is lower for hydrogen and fuel cell technology than for 
the conventional oil product and ICE technology (Hansen (2007c)). Thus, with these 
assumptions a minimum system efficiency of 62% is required for the hydrogen and fuel 
cell technology to contribute to a general progress in energy efficiency.  
Still, it is a challenge to reach even the worst case scenario for hydrogen production 
efficiency. For instance, hydrogen losses of 5-10% was reported by the European hydrogen 
bus project (The CUTE Project (2008)) due to purging of system components and 
background leakage. With such a loss rate it can be difficult to achieve a satisfactory 
system efficiency, but it is caused by technical problems that can be solved. 
When hydrogen becomes a fuel rather than a chemical, it will also be a problem to expand 
the practice of using cryogenic hydrogen delivery and storage and at the same time 
maintain high system efficiency because of the large energy loss associated with this 
method. 
It is a major concern for the prospects of fossil fuel based hydrogen with CCS whether the 
associated energy loss due to the CCS can be curbed sufficiently for the overall WtW 
efficiency of the hydrogen fuel to match that of oil products and of non-fossil based 
hydrogen. 
The lower limit of 62% system efficiency as a societal priority should, however, not be 
interpreted as an absolute limit. First, the increasing demand for hydrogen in the refining 
processes leads to lower system efficiency for conventional fuels. Second, the different 
energy forms involved (oil, gas, coal, electricity, heat, etc.) differ in usefulness and thus in 
value. One GJ of an energy commodity does not necessarily equal one GJ of the other. 
They also differ by environmental as well as security of supply properties. Third, 
conversion efficiencies can probably be developed significantly by learning-by-doing. 
Irrespective of hydrogen pathway, it is possible to perform with a higher WtW efficiency 
because of the fuel cell and electro-motor power-train. Thus, even if replacing one GJ 
petrol or diesel by one GJ hydrogen will add 50% to the transport service delivered, the 
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production of one GJ hydrogen requires more energy than the production of one GJ petrol 
or diesel. In a WtW perspective, the gain in transport services can be reduced to 0-14% if 
the system efficiency is 62-70% (respectively). Thus, minimum efficiency standards and 
economic incentives such as those used elsewhere to ensure energy efficiency may be 
necessary to ensure a significant contribution from the hydrogen transition to the overall 
efficiency of transport and economic activities in general. 
Security of supply 
Security of energy supply to the European Union is a complex problem that involves at 
long list of problems of which we will concentrate on four: First, the geological-economic 
capability of supply to respond to the increasing global demand for energy at the world 
markets. Second, the geographical distribution of the potential supply responses (i.e. reserves 
and resources), entailing geopolitical and market power issues. Third, the resilience of the 
global production, transport, and transformation networks providing the technical basis 
for the throughput of combustible energy. Fourth, the vulnerability of the European 
economies to increasing relative scarcity of primary energy commodities reflected in their 
world market prices.  
Hydrogen produced with or without CCS from natural gas or coal is in many scenarios 
expected to supply a large share of the market for hydrogen transport fuel in the future. 
Such a transition path will diversify the primary energy basis of transport from oil to 
natural gas and coal and in this sense improve the security of supply. Natural gas and coal 
supplies are, however, troubled by similar constraints due to geological-economic scarcity, 
geographical distribution of reserves, resilience of the global throughput, and 
vulnerability of the economies to supply failure and world market price increases. 
Table 3. Recent estimates of Europe's share of fossil fuel reserves. 
Oil BP Statistical Review Year-End 2007 1.3% 
Oil & Gas Journal January 1, 2008 1.1% 
World Oil Year-End 2006 1.3% 
Natural Gas BP Statistical Review Year-End 2007 3.3% 
CEDIGAZ January 1, 2008 3.5% 
Oil & Gas Journal January 1, 2008 2.8% 
World Oil Year-End 2006 2.7% 
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Coal Recoverable 
Anthracite and 
Bituminous 
 2.0% 
Recoverable Lignite 
and Subbituminous 
 9.1% 
Total Recoverable 
Coal 
 5.5% 
Source: Energy Information Administration (EIA) US DOE (2008), statistical appendices. 
Table 3 shows that Europe is not endowed with indigenous fossil energy sources. Only 
lignite and subbituminous coal is apparently abundant compared to the 9% of the world 
population living in Europe. 
Natural gas is expected to supply an increasing share of European energy demand in the 
future, but it is a non-renewable resource and the supply cannot increase forever. Much of 
the remaining reserves are comfortably situated around Europe in Russia, Central Asia, 
the Middle East, and North Africa, but as Stern (2007) points out, Europe will not be the 
only market for natural gas from these sources in the future. The important Russian and 
Central Asian reserves that Europe counts on will not least be in demand from the Russian 
market itself, not to mention the rest of Asia. Stern (2007) also questions whether the 
institutional frameworks in the natural gas producing countries will be adequate for the 
investments needed to bring all the natural gas on-stream. Thus, we should not take for 
granted that the European import from these sources can increase beyond 2020. This 
would severely limit the role that natural gas can play as a transitory energy source for 
transport.  
The ongoing expansion of the capacity for liquefaction in the gas producing countries and 
for regasification in Europe will certainly improve the resilience of the throughput of 
natural gas from sources to Europe, but it cannot change the increasing geological-
economic scarcity.  
Three quarters of the remaining global oil reserves are controlled by only nine countries, 
but the same countries control a similar share of the remaining natural gas reserves that 
are relevant to Europe (Hansen (2007d)).  
The market price of natural gas imports to Europe has always been closely linked to the 
world market price of oil (see Hansen (2007d), (2007e)). Ongoing attempts to create an 
independent spot market price for natural gas have achieved short term deviations in the 
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spot market price, whereas the long term relation between the oil price and the natural gas 
spot market price seem to persist (see European Commission - DG COMP (2004), 
Panagiotidis and Rutledge (2007) and for the US Villar and Joutz (2006)). Fundamental 
market mechanisms will most likely strengthen the close covariance of natural gas and oil 
prices as natural gas increasingly serves as primary energy basis for transport energy, 
directly or via hydrogen.  
The European economy is vulnerable to increasing oil and gas prices because of its 
significant net-imports of oil and gas compared to the GDP. On the member state level, 
this vulnerability is considerably larger in the new member states than in the old member 
states (Hansen (2007d)). Thus, an oil price increase implies a significant leak of national 
income from the economic circuit in Europe. Replacing oil and natural gas imports by 
energy from European sources would not only improve the overall terms of trade between 
Europe and the rest of the world, but also create jobs in the industries, providing the 
indigenous energy supply. Replacing oil by natural gas or even by coal imports, however, 
does not have the same effects. Only to the extend that the Well-to-Wheel efficiency of 
energy use is better because of the hydrogen and fuel cell technology associated with the 
natural gas and coal imports. This can, however, only amount to marginal improvements. 
Coal is, according to the government reports on remaining reserves, a relatively abundant 
energy resource with plenty of proven and recoverable reserves, but the quality of these 
data is increasingly questioned by independent centres for resource assessment. The 
Energy Watch Group (2007) even predicts that the global coal production due to 
geological-economic scarcity will reach its peak in the 2020s. According to Gerling et al. 
(2006) only 6% of the global hard coal reserves and 3% of the brown coal reserves are 
situated in Europe (classifying coal differently than in Table 3). It is ,however, 
questionable whether these reserves should be classified as economically recoverable 
reserves in the same way as, .e.g., South African coal is. In Europe the inexpensively 
exploitable coal reserves were mined long time ago, and the coal production has been in 
decline for decades as it becomes still more expensive to mine coal from still deeper and 
thinner seams. Much of the European hard coal production is only kept alive with the help 
of considerable government subsidies. These are allowed by the EU despite the fact that 
they obviously work against the Lisbon goal of economic growth as well as the climate 
policy goal of reducing CO2-emissions. The only reason for allowing it, after all, is to 
maintain access to indigenous sources of energy (The Council of the European Union 
(2002)). When subsidies and the restructuring of European coal industry is terminated, the 
reserves will likely be considerably lower. 
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Thus, much of the coal consumed in Europe originates from distant sources such as South 
Africa, Colombia, and Russia. A value added chain analysis by Gerling, Rempel et al. 
(2006) showed that about half the cost of hard coal8 in Europe in 2005 was transport costs 
that vary closely with the price of oil. In addition, there is a substitution effect on the coal 
cost net of transport costs. It is not as strong as the oil-gas substitution effect, but it will be 
rising if more coal is used for production of synthetic diesel or DME9. Thus, switching 
from oil to coal as a primary energy basis for transport fuels will only partly escape the 
negative effects from the oil market. 
The ongoing innovation of CCS technology will probably before 2020 show which 
solutions we can expect to be competitive. In many future scenarios, this technology is 
expected to open up for large amounts of low carbon energy to the European market. A 
note of caution is, however, warranted on this perspective keeping the high transport cost 
of coal in mind. When a competitive CCS technology is ready, it will be available all over 
the world. Thus, it is possible, that it will be more competitive to generate hydrogen from 
coal at the location of coal extraction (e.g., South Africa, Central Asia) and then ship the 
hydrogen to Europe, than it will be to ship the coal and generate the hydrogen in Europe. 
In that case, CCS technology in Europe would, however, still be useful in combustion and 
gasification of European combustible energy sources. 
 
 
Table 4. The EU share of the world recoverable uranium resources (RAR+inferred) by 
extraction cost. 
 < USD 40/kgU < USD 80/kgU < USD 130/kgU 
EU share 3.4% 0.5% 1.9% 
Source: OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
(2008). 
Uranium deposits occur in many countries, but as shown in Table 4 the economically 
recoverable reserves are primarily located outside of Europe like oil and gas reserves. The 
                                                 
8 The energy density of lignite is to low to warrant long transport. 
9 Rising coal demand along with a rising oil demand from China and India also leads to simultaneously 
rising oil and coal prices at the world market. Rising coal prices at the world market may, on the other hand, 
make more European coal resources economically recoverable. 
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OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
(2008) expects that it is possible to double the global uranium extraction at cost below USD 
80/kgU to approximately 120,000 tU per year in 2016. At a constant rate of extraction these 
resources would allow for uranium extraction well into the 2040s. 
The binding constraint for expansion of nuclear energy in Europe is, however, rather 
public acceptance than this economic-geological scarcity. Locations where the general 
public accepts nuclear energy production, fuel processing, and waste deposition are very 
scarce and has been so for decades, irrespective of economic costs. New generations of 
nuclear energy technology may change that as well as make use of more abundant 
resources such as thorium. 
The Commission of the European Communities (2007b) considers generally renewable 
energy to “contribute to security of supply by increasing the share of domestically 
produced energy, diversifying the fuel mix, diversifying the sources of energy imports and 
increasing the proportion of energy obtained from politically stable regions.” (p. 14). They 
are, however, also subject to a combined geographical-geological-economic scarcity as 
many of them are land intensive. This is a matter of land use (less severe for offshore wind 
power) where several other interests are at play. Thus, the resources that realistically can 
be recovered depend to a high degree on public acceptance which in turn is affected by the 
arrangements for redistribution of the resource rents. Moreover, many renewable resource 
technologies are under development and their development depends partly on the rate of 
their deployment. Due to these complicated aspects, it is difficult to assess the 
economically recoverable renewable energy resources. 
For renewable energy, resource assessments consequently differentiate between the 
physical (or theoretical), practical (or technical) and realisable (or economic) potential 
within a given time frame. According to a recent study of the renewable energy potentials 
in the OECD countries and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), the 
the total renewable energy potential amounts to approximately 9,000 TWh electricity, 
5,700 TWh heat, and 1,700 TWh biofuels for transport in the 2020 perspective for these 
countries. The European shares of these potentials are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5. EU27 shares of OECD+BRICS renewable energy potentials realisable by 2020. 
Percent. 
Biogas   19% 
Solid biomass  20% 
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Renewable  municipal waste  15% 
Geothermal  electricity 11% 
Hydropower   11% 
Solar photovoltaics 23% 
Solar thermal electricity 33% 
Tidal and wave energy 80% 
Onshore wind  31% 
Offshore wind  59% 
Total RES-E  20% 
Biofuels  (domestic) 27% 
Solar thermal heat 27% 
Geothermal  heat 25% 
Biomass  CHP heat  24% 
Total RES-H  25% 
Source: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2008). 
The EU is inhabited by 15% of the total OECD and BRICS population and in this 
perspective EU is especially well endowed with wind, wave/tide, and solar thermal 
electricity resources. Such renewable and non-combustable energy resources could form 
an indigenous primary energy basis for hydrogen. 
Like coal, indigenous first generation biofuels from Europe are not competitive with the 
products of large foreign producers. For second generation technologies, the biomass 
resources shown in Table 5 can be rich sources of either “classical” biofuels or hydrogen 
production. 
Especially, the European wind resources are relatively abundant, in particular, in 
Northern Europe and in mountain areas. The enormous offshore wind resources in the 
Atlantic, the North Sea, and the Baltic Sea are only little exploited. Concerted investments 
in the necessary transmission lines and adapting the national power grids to allow more 
renewable energy production are central EU decisions for harvesting these resources.   
The non-combustible energy resources are of particular interest since most of them 
provide the same power load around the clock. This was formerly regarded as a 
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drawback, but with the possibility of storing electricity in car batteries and hydrogen, the 
drawback can be reversed to an advantage. If Europe’s rich endowment of non-
combustible resources is exploited, the result will be a significant supply of low cost off-
peak electricity providing a stable and steadily increasing primary energy source of 
hydrogen. It will also reduce the vulnerability of the European economies to increasing oil 
prices and create job it will reduce the worries – justified or not – of hold-up of the 
throughput from the countries exporting oil and gas to Europe. 
Indigenous primary energy is an important aspect of security of supply and hydrogen can 
be the link between transport and the considerable wind, wave/tide, and geothermal 
electricity resources that Europe command. In particular, in the period up to 2020, it must 
be expected that wind power will expand considerably in Europe, producing large 
amounts of off-peak energy with little other competition than storage for transport use. 
Eco-efficiency 
The EU target of reducing CO2 emissions by 20% of the 1990 level in 2020 also implies a 
similar targeted rate of progress in eco-efficiency, the ratio of an indicator of economic 
activity to an indicator of the environmental pressure, it causes. On the level of aggregate 
GDP for EU27, the macroeconomic requirement derived from the GHG target is to sustain 
an average growth rate in eco-efficiency of 3.3% from 2005 to 2020. This is ambitious too as 
the GHG-efficiency growth rate achieved from 1995 to 2005 was on average 2.4%. 
Since the start of the GHG accounts in 1990, transport activities have caused a rising share 
of Europe’s total GHG emissions to the level of 21% in 2004 (EU15). The 20% target is 
hardly achievable without reversing this trend and it raises the question whether 
hydrogen and fuel cells in automotive use can contribute to this. 
The immediate answer is no for the simple reason that until 2020 there will in any case be 
a very small number of fuel cell vehicles on the roads. Most likely, they will be too few to 
make any difference in the European GHG accounts. However, climate policy doesn’t end 
in 2020 and the perspective as far as the EU is concerned is to continue to reduce GHG 
emissions to a level that is 60-80% lower than the 1990 level in 2050.  
To study the possible contribution to GHG emission reduction from the introduction of 
passenger cars with hydrogen and fuel cell technology on the European market, a series of  
scenarios were produced with the Sustainable Mobility Project Model (World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) and International Energy Agency (IEA) 
(2004)). They are documented in Hansen (2007a). 
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The scenarios introduced passenger cars with fuel cell technology on the European market 
from 2015 with a market share growing to 43% in 2050. Two different scenarios with 
respect to feedstock for hydrogen production were created. One scenario assumed that the 
hydrogen was produced on the basis of natural gas whereas the other scenario assumed 
that it was produced by electrolysis from renewable or nuclear energy.  
The contribution to the GHG emission reduction was very different in the two scenarios. 
In the natural gas based scenario, the aggregate GHG emissions from passenger cars in 
Europe 2050 was reduced by 14% corresponding to 5% of the emissions from the total 
transport sector. This scenario is shown in the figure below. 
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Figure 1. Impact on European GHG emissions from passenger cars of replacing oil 
products by NATURAL GAS based hydrogen in fuel cell cars reaching a market share 
of 43% in 2050.  
Source: Hansen (2007a). 
The reference scenario emissions in Figure 1 (the dotted bold curve, left axis) are expected 
to decline due to a higher market share of energy efficient cars (particularly diesel) as fuel 
prices increase. The active scenario shows the emissions that would result from 
introducing hydrogen and fuel cell cars (bold curve, left axis). The slim curve refers to the 
right axis and shows the deviation of the active from the reference scenario in percent. 
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The result shows that there will be a reduction in GHG emissions, but a rather modest one. 
Even if all diesel and petrol cars were replaced by fuel cell cars, half of the GHG emissions 
would still remain because hydrogen is produced by natural gas. This is, however, not 
necessary. The same scenario with hydrogen produced from non-combustible sources can 
produce quite different results. 
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Figure 2. Impact on European GHG emissions from passenger cars of replacing oil 
products by non-combustible based hydrogen in fuel cell cars reaching a market share 
of 43% in 2050. 
Source:Hansen (2007a). 
Figure 2 shows that with the production of hydrogen from CO2 neutral feedstock the 
emissions from passenger car transport will be reduced by almost 60%.  
With reference to these scenarios, European governments would have important 
environmental reasons to support hydrogen as a transport fuel as long as it is based on 
non-combustible energy, but only little reason if it is based on natural gas or coal without 
carbon capturing and sequestration.  
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Biomass and coal based hydrogen with CCS can provide hydrogen fuel with GHG 
emissions close to the non-combustible alternative depending on the actual provision of 
the fuel, the hydrogen production technique and the use of CCS.  
The two scenarios were also used to study the impact on local air pollutants emitted from 
passenger car transport such as particle matter (PM), nitrate oxides (NOx), volatile organic 
compounds (VOC), and carbon monoxide (CO). These pollutants affect human mortality 
and morbidity and are responsible for damages on environmental qualities. 
The study showed that on the aggregate level the emissions of these pollutants were 
already drastically reduced in the reference scenario at the time when the fuel cell cars are 
introduced to the market. This is a result of the EU and member state efficiency 
requirements, fuel and exhaust standards, and other initiatives under the CAFÉ 
programme for eliminating air pollution that damages human health. The results are 
shown below. 
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Figure 3. Impact on PM emissions from passenger cars of replacing oil products by 
CARBON FREE LEAN based hydrogen in fuel cell cars reaching a market share of 43% 
in 2050 in Europe. 
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Source: Hansen (2007a). 
The non-combustible based hydrogen in Figure 3 shows a very modest impact of using 
green carbon free hydrogen for transport. This is because the CAFE-policies aim at 
eliminating the health damaging pollution from stationary as well as mobile sources. The 
reference scenario assumes that these programmes will be implemented affectively and 
timely and with the desired results. These assumptions may be overly optimistic, but 
much of the local air pollution can be avoided by applying the exhaust, engine, and fuel 
standards, filters, etc. as planned according to the the EU CAFÉ policies.  
Natural gas reforming would relocate emissions from the mobile to the stationary sources 
and with the same assumptions of effective elimination of local pollutants a similar result 
could have been achieved. 
The aggregate emissions shown in Figure 3 are, however, not the adequate indicators for 
local pollutants. These pollutants are trapped in locked air-sheds and city air at several 
locations around in Europe. In these locations governments have a particular reason for 
continuously supporting the use of electric vehicles whether battery or fuel cell electric 
and even in some places hybrid electric. The following figure shows how these spots on 
the European looked in the year 2000 and how they are expected to look in 2020 after the 
implementation of the EU Air Strategy and Maximum Climate Action policies. 
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Figure 4. Concentrations of PM 2.5 exceeding the health (mortality) limits in2000 and 
2005. 
Source: Hansen (2007a). 
The indicator used in the figure is the particle caused mortality measured as the loss of 
statistical life expectancy due to very fine particles (2.5 microns) from combustion. Several 
other local pollutants could have been mapped here, but their geographical distribution 
and intensity are not very different from that of the fine particle pollution shown here. 
The maps show in accordance with the modelled scenarios above that the programmes 
improving the fuel and exhaust standards, emission standards etc. in Europe have the 
potential of solving a large part of the most severe pollution problems, but not all. There is 
a strong case for regional policies on parking fees, parking rights, road tolls, etc. favouring 
the use of BEVs, HEVs, PHEVs, and FCEVs. Policies along these lines are already being 
planned or adopted in cities like London and Milano. 
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Summing up, the high fuel efficiency of FCEVs contributes in any case to reduction of 
GHG emissions as they gain a higher market share at the cost of ICVs or HEVs. This 
contribution is, however, very small. In the scenarios above, when basing hydrogen on 
non-combustible energy sources or fossil sources with CCS, even a 43% market share in 
2050 would eliminate more than half of the GHG emissions from passenger cars in 2050. 
The effect on emissions of local pollutants is a different story. The regulation of emissions 
of local pollutants not only from car exhaust, but also from stationary sources is capable of 
reducing the future pollution considerably, even before the hydrogen and fuel cell 
technology is matured to introduction in large scale in automotive transport. Thus, the 
hydrogen and fuel cell technology is not essential for reducing the bulk of the air pollution 
causing health damages. However, the results shown in Figure 4 indicate that electric 
vehicles - and not least FCEVs - with their zero tail pipe emissions will be essential for 
eliminating the rest of the unacceptable health impact from air pollution. This conclusion 
applies in particular to the European regions with the highest population (and car) density 
where fuel cell busses also can be expected to be an important part of the solution.  
Cost-efficiency 
The cost efficiency of FCEVs relative to their competitors depends on the vehicle 
ownership costs as well as the fuel cost per kilometre. The cost of an FCEV put into mass 
production in 2020 cannot be predicted with any degree of useful accuracy. In broad 
terms, the future use of the technology rests on assumptions that costs can be reduced by 
an order of magnitude through research in design, materials, etc., and, when produced in 
large scale series, by another order of magnitude through industrial learning. In that 
perspective, any calculation of a more exact level of production costs for future FCEVs will 
be very speculative. Here, it is just assumed that it will be possible at some time in the 
2015-2025 period to produce an FCEVs that are comparable with advanced HEVs, PHEVs, 
and advanced ICEs in cost, performance, and durability. The focus can then be 
concentrated on the fuel cost per kilometre. The fuel cost is highly dependant of the 
international oil price, which is also difficult to predict for the period of 2015-2025 with 
any degree of certainty. However, we can calculate the threshold value of the oil price that 
makes hydrogen competitive as a transport fuel. 
Hansen (2007b) uses this approach and calculates similarly the fuel costs without very 
specific assumptions about the specific technologies that will deliver the hydrogen. The 
model is based on the simple assumptions of the cost of the primary energy commodity, 
the conversions factors and the non-energy costs of each link in the fuel chain. 
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The transport fuel pathways considered are oil to petrol and diesel, natural gas to 
hydrogen, and non-combustible energy to hydrogen. Coal is not considered, because the 
CCS technology and infrastructure will hardly be developed to a competitive technology 
before the 2020s. Biomass-to-hydrogen pathways are also not considered for similar 
reasons.  
The natural gas price follows the oil price quite closely although not as closely as the 
petrol and diesel prices. Non-combustible energy are expected to deliver electricity at a 
long run marginal cost basis €c5.0-7.3 per kWh (€ in 2005 prices). The actual level of 
electricity prices in the day time may be considerably higher since it depends on the 
marginal costs of power production, which is typically based on natural gas and oil. Thus, 
to take advantage of the European non-combustible energy resources for hydrogen will be 
a challenge to the design of the complex European systems of CO2 quotas, subsidies, 
taxes, green certificates, and feed-in tariffs. 
The statistical covariation between the spot market price for oil and the retail price of fuels 
is taken to reflect the system efficiency (conversion, transport, storage, retail) and non-
energy costs of the fuel chain. The same approach is used for natural gas. For hydrogen, 
the fuel chain doesn’t exist yet and the approach here is to use the retail natural gas price 
and electricity price with expected system efficiency ratios and non-energy costs of the 
future hydrogen fuel chain. 
For natural gas based hydrogen the system efficiency is assumed to be 70% and the non-
energy costs to be €10 per GJ in the best case. In the worst case a system efficiency of 62% 
and non-energy costs of €14 is assumed. For electrolysis, the best/worst case assumptions 
are accordingly 70%/65% and €10/€15 per GJ. The reader is referred to Hansen (2007b) and 
Hansen (2007e) for additional background information about these assumptions. 
Based on these assumptions, the threshold prices can be identified as the intersections of 
the cost per km curves in Figure 5 below. 
 
26 
 
 
Figure 5. Per km fuel cost of ICE and FCEV technology with natural gas based and non-
fossil electricity based hydrogen. Best case. No taxes. 
The intersections show threshold oil prices of $190 per barrel (Brent quality, in 2005 US 
dollars) for natural gas based hydrogen vs. conventional fuels in the best cases (in the 
worst case, it is far outside the scope of the diagram). However, the study also shows that 
at this level of oil price, hydrogen based on non-combustible energy has already been 
competitive to conventional fuels since the oil price was $105 and to natural gas based 
hydrogen at an oil price of $85 (in the worst case $175 and $135). Only if prices are lower 
than $85 per barrel ($135 in the worst case) will natural gas based hydrogen be competitive 
to non-combustible based hydrogen (but not to conventional fuels). 
Most of the earlier studies such as The Alternative Fuels Contact Group (2004), The US 
National Academy of Science US National Academy of Science (2004), Ogden, Williams et 
al. (2004), and The International Energy Agency (2005) have all envisaged transition 
scenarios in which hydrogen in the beginning of the transition was produced from natural 
gas. This is because they have assumed oil prices in the $25-60 interval. In that interval, the 
competitive order is clearly that conventional fuels are most cost effective, then, natural 
gas based hydrogen and, then, non-combustible based hydrogen. The price level of the 
first half of 2008, however, gives an indications of the price level that can be expected once 
the world economy gets over the recessions anticipated in 2009. 
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If we consider a future with oil prices on the other side of $100 per barrel, the competitive 
order is totally reversed: Now Non-combustible based hydrogen is the most competitive, 
then natural gas based hydrogen and then conventional fuels. 
Until know, the taxes have been excluded from the analysis. This does not represent a 
serious error when applied to the US fuel markets, but it makes the analysis very 
hypothetical when it comes to the costs of European consumers. All the EU countries 
adhere to the minimum tax of about €10 per GJ (2005€) on petrol and diesel and many of 
them apply tax rates about twice this minimum. High fuel taxes amplify the effect of the 
fuel economy on the cost per km and FCEVs will therefore be attractive from a cost point 
of view to European consumers before it will be so to US consumers (provided that the 
differences in taxation persist). To the consumers in a country that only charges the 
minimum tax of €10 per GJ on hydrogen as well as petrol and diesel, hydrogen is 
competitive with the conventional fuels already at $85 per barrel for natural gas as well as 
non-combustible based hydrogen. 
 
Figure 6. Per km fuel cost of ICE and FCEV technology with natural gas based and non-
fossil electricity based hydrogen. Best case. Fuel taxes €10/GJ on all fuels. 
Figure 6 shows the best case scenario in a case where only the minimum rate of fuel 
taxation (€10/GJ) applies. Some EU countries such as UK, Germany, and Netherlands have 
twice as high fuel taxes and the most countries are in between. In the worst case scenario 
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with €10/GJ fuel taxation of all fuels, non-combustible based hydrogen still becomes 
competitive with natural gas based hydrogen at $135 and with non-combustible based 
hydrogen $150 per barrel. This is because the high efficiency advantage of the FCEV is 
eaten up by the conversion losses in the hydrogen production process.  
It must be anticipated that the European fuel taxes in 2015-2025 will be adjusted to provide 
even better incentives to contribute to the goals of the common energy policy. This will 
probably mean a higher level of taxation – at least in the countries that are close to the 
minimum taxes. It could also mean that taxes will be differentiated according to the 
environmental pressure, they cause per energy unit or per km. On the other hand 
hydrogen involves much larger energy losses in production and distribution than petrol 
and diesel does, which makes a case for taxing energy losses in production as well as in 
use. This would deteriorate the competitiveness of hydrogen from natural gas as well as 
electricity, but if the tax is differentiated according to emission rates, it will be more so for 
natural gas. 
The conclusion is that a continuing European policy of fuel taxation would be sufficient to 
ensure the competitiveness of the introduction of hydrogen and fuel cell technology. 
Moreover, the widespread belief that natural gas based hydrogen will provide the most 
cost effective supply in the 2020s, rests on an assumption of low oil prices that is clearly 
debatable. 
However, the future fuel taxation policy has to take account of the much larger energy loss 
in the hydrogen production process than in oil refining. This has not been in the focus as 
long as hydrogen was a chemical, but now it becomes a fuel, it will become socially 
preferable that the efficiency of the entire hydrogen fuel chain is at least on the same level 
as the efficiency of the conventional fuel chain. Thus it is necessary to provide efficiency 
incentives in hydrogen production. 
A simple way to do this would be to apply a production tax of the same level as the price 
of the emission allowance unit (EAU) at the European Emission Trading System (ETS). 
This can however not replace the present fuel taxes as it would be a much lower amount 
per GJ or per litre and therefore have the opposite effects on efficiency. A similar system 
would be recommendable for all industry which is not included in the ETS. 
The prospective contributions hydrogen and fuel cell technology 
A transition to hydrogen and fuel technology in automotive transport will be conducive to 
achieving the goals of energy efficiency because it makes use of the energy efficient fuel cell 
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and electro-motor drive train. The size of the contribution, however, depends crucially on 
the system efficiency of the hydrogen production and delivery infrastructure. A tax on 
hydrogen feedstocks linked to the Emission Allowance Unit price on the ETS market 
would provide incentives for operation and equipment according to the highest efficiency 
standards and would prevent price distortions between the ETS sector and the non-ETS 
sector. 
The transition will also be conducive to the goals of security of energy supply and eco-
efficiency because of the more efficient use of energy. These effects are, however, rather 
modest in comparison with the magnitude of the changes required and the energy 
efficiency of other advanced solutions in the transport sector. 
Replacing oil by indigenous energy sources in Europe will reduce the risk of hold-up in 
the throughput of oil (and gas) and reduce the bill to be paid by an oil price increase. 
Europe is a net-importer of all non-renewable energy resources but is relatively well 
endowed with renewable energy resources. The transition to hydrogen and fuel cells can 
help making these resources more valuable by using off-peak power that otherwise 
doesn’t have many high value applications for a high value application like automotive 
mobility. In this sense it may contribute to supply security through replacing imported by 
indigenous primary energy. 
Hydrogen produced from non-combustible fuels would contribute significantly to 
reducing atmospheric as well as local pollution. This would not be the case if it was made 
from natural gas and only partly be the case it was made from natural gas with CCS. 
The cost of fuel per km is higher for non-combustible based hydrogen than for natural gas 
based hydrogen, which again is more expensive than petrol and diesel in a competing 
vehicle. However, this is only if the oil price in the future will be lower than $85 per barrel. 
For oil prices above $85 transport fuelled by hydrogen from non-combustible energy will 
be less expensive than transport fuelled by natural gas and by $105 also less expensive 
than transport fuelled by diesel and petrol. In other words, the order of competitiveness 
will be totally reversed. 
These results apply for the best case with maximum efficiency in hydrogen production. 
Less optimistic assumptions result in much weaker cost efficiency of hydrogen. 
The high fuel taxes applied in Europe reinforce the cost effectiveness caused by the 
efficiency advantage of the FCEV. Thus, FCEV transport will become competitive earlier 
on the European market than in the US. 
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 In general, the contributions of the hydrogen transition to achieving the European energy 
policy goals depends on whether a similar transition goes on in the power and heat sector 
towards non-fossil energy. Indeed, a double transition is required for hydrogen and fuel 
cell technology to contribute significantly to the European energy and climate policy goals. 
Thus, the transition of the power and heat sector to non-fossil energy and of the transport 
sector to hydrogen will be mutually reinforcing. 
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